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Abstract 
Economists generally accept the proposition that high and volatile inflation rates 
generate inefficiencies that reduce society’s welfare. Furthermore, studies have shown 
that inflation is harmful to economic growth. However, determining the causes of the 
worldwide diversity of inflationary experiences is an important challenge not yet 
satisfactorily confronted by the profession. Based on a broad dataset covering over 100 
countries for the period 1975-1997 and using dynamic and static panel data econometric 
techniques, this paper shows that a higher degree of political instability is associated 
with both higher inflation levels and volatility. Not only does this paper advance the 
political economy literature establishing a relationship between inflation moments and 
political instability, but it also has important policy implications regarding the optimal 
design of inflation stabilization programs and of the institutions favorable to price 
stability. 
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1. Introduction 
It is generally recognized that high and volatile inflation rates generate inefficiencies 
that reduce society’s welfare.1 Given the costs associated with high inflation it may 
seem odd that so many countries have experienced it. The great diversity of inflationary 
processes across countries is also a puzzling phenomenon. One possible explanation 
relies on different characteristics of the tax systems resulting from unequal levels of 
development and/or economic structures. Countries with inefficient tax systems have to 
resort more frequently to seigniorage revenues, thus increasing inflation. Several 
political economy models rely on the characteristics of the political systems and 
institutions to explain the diversity of macroeconomic policies adopted and, 
consequently, the diversity of inflation rates observed. Suboptimal policies leading to 
high inflation could result from political instability, polarization or weak institutions. 
 The main purpose of this paper is to empirically determine the main causes of 
the worldwide diversity of inflationary experiences, a challenge not yet satisfactorily 
confronted by the profession for three fundamental reasons. First, there is no empirical 
work that thoroughly examines the determinants of inflation volatility. Second, 
empirical models explaining inflation levels in the literature generally fail to account for 
inflation inertia and for the endogeneity of important economic and political variables 
affecting inflation. We use GMM estimation applied to dynamic panel data introduced 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) to address some of the econometric limitations of the OLS 
models previously used in the literature. Third, the advent of new datasets, such as the 
DPI from Beck et al. (2001), with more recent data for existing and new political and 
economic variables greatly facilitates the measurement of political instability, which 
may be related to high inflation. The use of this and other data sources combined with 
                                                 
1 For a textbook exposition of the costs of inflation, see Romer (2001, 519-523). Empirical studies, such 
as Fisher, Sahay and Végh (2002), show that high inflation is detrimental to GDP per capita growth and 
to economic performance in general. 
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modern econometric techniques might provide more accurate estimations of 
relationships between inflation levels and political instability. 
Relying upon the previously noted theories and using a dataset covering 154 
countries for the period 1975-97, we investigate the main economic and political 
determinants of inflation levels and volatility. After controlling for the countries’ 
economic structure and for the behavior of economic variables that may influence 
inflation, we find that political instability leads to higher and more volatile inflation. 
Furthermore, the impact of political instability on inflation levels and volatilities is 
much stronger for high inflation than for moderate and low inflation countries and also 
seems to be stronger for developing than for industrial nations. Additionally, institutions 
such as economic freedom and democracy are important determinants of inflation. In 
particular, higher degrees of economic freedom are associated with lower inflation 
levels and volatility. 
 The paper is structured as follows. A description of worldwide inflation patterns 
and a literature review on the relationship between inflation and political 
instability/institutions are presented in section 2. The dataset and the empirical models 
are described in section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Political instability, institutions and inflation 
 For our purposes, it should be extremely informative to analyze cross-regional 
inflation data worldwide. The high diversity observed in the 23-year period of 1975-
1997 is striking; for example, note that average yearly inflation in Latin America and 
Caribbean (LAC) countries of roughly 150% is more than 20 times higher than the 
average inflation in the industrial countries for the same period. African countries also 
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endured average inflation rates of over 100% a year in the period, while Asian countries 
had average inflation lower than 20%. The chart below shows average inflation for the 
period 1975-1997 for each region of the world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The existence of high variability of inflation rates around the world is well 
known. However, economists are less aware of the cross-regional differences in 
inflation volatilities. The chart below shows inflation volatility calculated using the 
coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by mean). 
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The variability observed in inflation volatilities is also very high. In Africa, for 
example, inflation is at least eight times more volatile than in the Developed World. 
LAC also shows high volatility, with inflation roughly four times more volatile than in 
the developed countries. A quick analysis of the charts above indicates a close 
relationship between inflation levels and volatility. As pointed out by Fischer, Sahay 
and Vegh (2002), the higher the inflation rate, the more volatile and unstable it 
becomes. The remainder of this section and sections 3 and 4 of the paper elucidate the 
reasons behind the cross-country variability in inflation levels and volatility relating it to 
political instability. 
Most economists acknowledge that differences in monetary and fiscal policies 
among countries are the main reasons behind the inflation variability they sustain. But 
this explanation leads to a much deeper and fundamental question, which is why 
countries differ on the way they conduct fiscal and monetary policies. Many attempts 
have been made to explain theoretically and empirically the high inflation levels 
observed in different countries, taking into account the deeper sources of inflation. 
Edwards and Tabellini (1991) offer a survey of the theoretical explanations. One 
expalanation, perhaps most applicable to developed countries is based upon the Theory 
of Optimal Taxation (see Phelps, 1973; Vegh, 1989; and Aizenman, 1992). According 
to this theory, governments optimally equate the marginal cost of the inflation tax with 
the marginal cost of output taxes. An appropriate procedure to test the validity of this 
theory is to verify if data on variations of income taxes and variations in inflation are 
positively correlated and close to one. Edwards and Tabellini (1991) fail to find 
evidence that the Theory of Optimal Taxation applies to the developing countries. In 
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fact, they find evidence that political instability measured by government changes and 
polarization lead to higher inflation in these countries. A theoretical rationale for this 
finding is provided by the models of Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Tabellini and 
Alesina (1990), who  analyze the effects of political instability and polarization on the 
determination of fiscal deficits and debt. If a government believes it has a small 
probability of remaining in power, it might finance additional expenditures with debt 
issuance since it does not internalize the costs associated with debt repayment and it 
also constrains the government expenditures of the party that wins the next election. 
This process results in higher deficits and debt. According to this theory, politically 
unstable and more polarized countries should present higher fiscal deficits and higher 
and more volatile inflation. 
Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) provided evidence showing that 
higher degrees of political instability lead to higher inflation rates. This measure of 
instability was derived from a probit model that attempted to explain the likelihood that 
an incumbent government would remain in power. In the empirical analysis of section 
4, we employ alternative measures of instability; we use variables that count the exact 
number of government crises or cabinet changes taking place in a particular year. These 
variables are equally capable or superior in reflecting political instability and instability 
of economic policies than the variable used by Cukierman et al. (1992). Two 
shortcomings of the analysis in Cukierman et al. (1992) are the presence of endogeneity 
in some explanatory variables and the absence of explanatory variables accounting for 
inflation inertia.  
Why should a greater number of cabinet changes or government crises lead to 
higher and more volatile inflation? First, in a country characterized by frequent changes 
in the composition of government, there are also frequent changes in macroeconomic 
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policies, as new prime ministers or ministers of finance/economics do not necessarily 
share the views of their predecessors. Then, these changes in macroeconomic policies 
lead to higher inflation volatility. Second, frequent cabinet changes and government 
crises shorten the horizon of the members of government, as they are not certain that 
they will keep their posts during an entire term. The higher the probability of being 
replaced, the greater will be the importance attributed to short-term objectives. Then, it 
is difficult to maintain low and stable inflation. 
Paldam (1987) studies the relation between inflation and political instability in 
eight Latin American countries. He argues that this relation works both ways. The main 
connections from inflation to instability would be related to the costs of inflation and to 
the responsibility hypothesis, according to which people hold governments responsible 
for economic outcomes. One very robust result of the vote and popularity functions 
literature2 is that higher inflation is associated with lower popularity and votes. Thus, 
when inflation rises, the probability that the current government will remain in power 
decreases. The causality from politics to inflation would be primarily related to the 
demand for public expenditures (which weak governments seldom resist) that are then 
financed by the inflation tax. Later on, when inflation has risen to high levels, it will be 
much harder for a weak and unstable government to resist the political pressures asking 
for accommodating policies.. 
The importance of political cohesion has also been stressed in the literature. 
Drazen (2000) shows that interest groups want other groups to bear the costs of 
disinflation since they consider it a public good. Very fragmented societies with a 
variety of interest groups and weak political institutions are unable to make tough 
decisions and change the status quo in the face of adverse economic circumstances. In 
                                                 
2 See Nannestad and Paldam (1994) for a survey. 
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the case of societies suffering from chronic inflation, rates of inflation tend, according 
to this theory, to be more persistent, higher and more volatile.3 Some authors have also 
stressed the importance of institutions on economic performance. Acemoglu et al. 
(2002) show that institutions are a very important element explaining growth rates for a 
cross-section of different countries. In the next sections we also estimate the impact of 
institutions on inflation levels and volatility. 
Finally, the literature studying developing countries also addresses a set of 
structural variables affecting the ability of governments to collect taxes. According to 
this structural view, the taxing capacity of a country is technologically constrained by its 
stage of development and by the structure of the economy and, therefore, as tax 
collecting costs are high and tax evasion pervasive, countries might use the inflation tax 
more consistently as the primary way to finance their government expenditures. 
Overall, the theoretical and empirical literature surveyed support the view that 
higher degrees of political instability are associated with higher inflation rates. It is 
natural to think that the different elements behind the explanation of inflation levels 
should also be present in a study of inflation volatility. Therefore, we do not only 
review the issue of inflation levels, but we also add to the literature analyzing cross-
country differences in inflation volatility. 
 
3. Data and the empirical model 
 The dataset is composed of annual data on political, institutional and economic 
variables for 154 countries, for the years 1975 to 1997. The choice of the period of 
                                                 
3 The literature on “wars of attrition” between conflicting interest groups was initiated by Alesina and 
Drazen (1991). Veiga (2000) provides empirical evidence that higher fragmentation of the political 
system leads to greater delays of inflation stabilization. 
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analysis was driven by the fact that the Database of Political Institutions (version 3.0),4 
from which we collect data on many political and institutional variables, covers these 23 
years. The other sources of political and institutional data are: the Cross National Time 
Series Data Archive of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research; the Polity IV (Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions) dataset;5 the 
2002 Annual Report of the Economic Freedom of the World (Gwartney and Lawson, 
2002);6 and the Freedom House ratings on political rights and civil liberties.7 Economic 
data was collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and Global 
Development Finance, the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics and Direction of Trade Statistics, the OECD Statistical Compendium, and 
Dollar (1992). Appendix 1 presents a description of all variables used, grouped by 
sources. 
The objective of our empirical exercise is to investigate the main political, 
institutional and economic determinants of inflation levels and volatility across 
countries and time. This is done estimating dynamic panel data models for annual 
inflation levels and static panel data models for standard deviations of inflation for 
consecutive 3-year periods. Since inflation levels and standard deviations have very 
high variability, their logarithms were used as our dependent variables: Log(Inf), stands 
for the log of inflation levels and Log[SD(Inf)] stands for the log of the standard 
deviation of inflation. We hypothesize that these depend on the following explanatory 
variables: 
                                                 
4 On this database, see Beck et al. (2001). Available on the Internet though Philip Keefer’s page in the 
World Bank’s site (http://www.worldbank.org/research/bios/pkeefer.htm). 
5 Available on the Internet (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm). 
6 Available on the Internet (http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html). This report presents data on the 
index of economic freedom and its components for the years 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 
2000. In order to avoid a great number of missing values in our sample, straight-line interpolation was 
used to generate annual data.  
7 Available on the Internet (http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/). 
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• Lagged logarithm of inflation, L.Log(Inf). Given the abundant evidence of inflation 
inertia found in empirical studies, a positive coefficient is expected for L.Log(inf). 
• A set of variables representing political instability and institutions: 
o Cabinet changes, Cabchg, is our main proxy for political instability. It is 
defined as follows: the number of times in a year that a new premier is named 
and/or 50% of the cabinet posts are occupied by new ministers. This 
definition means that a cabinet change occurs only when there are very 
important changes in the composition of government. These can result from 
several events: an election won by a party that was previously in the 
opposition; a government crisis in which the government does not fall, but at 
least 50% of the ministers are replaced; the government falls, and a new one 
is formed by parties previously in the opposition, without the need to 
anticipate elections; a coup d’etat or a revolution leads to a change of 
government. According to the models described in section 2, this variable 
should be positively related to inflation levels and volatility (positive 
coefficients are expected).  
o Index of economic freedom, Index. Higher indexes are associated with 
smaller governments (Area I), stronger legal structure and security of 
property rights (Area II), access to sound money (Area III), greater freedom 
to exchange with foreigners (Area IV), and more flexible regulations of 
credit, labor, and business (Area V). All of these are characteristics of 
advanced and liberalized economies where seigniorage and other forms of 
distortionary taxation are generally absent. Thus, we expect that greater 
economic freedom is associated with lower inflation levels and volatilities 
(negative coefficients are expected). 
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o Polity scale, Polity2: ranges from strongly autocratic (-10) to strongly 
democratic (10). Although industrialized countries have low inflation and are 
democratic, in developing countries, which are the majority in our sample, 
authoritarian/autocratic regimes may be better able to control inflation, as 
Haggard and Kaufman (1992) and Paldam (1987) suggest. Thus, when all 
countries are considered, we expect positive coefficients for this variable. 
• A set of economic structural variables that reflect characteristics of the countries 
that may affect their capacity to control inflation: 
o The share of the value added of agriculture in GDP, Agric_va. According to 
Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992), the agricultural sector is the 
hardest to tax, which implies greater reliance on seigniorage revenues in 
countries where its share of GDP is higher. Thus, positive coefficients are 
expected for this variable, as seigniorage leads to inflation; 
o GDP per capita, GDP_ppp. Following Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini 
(1992), we expect this variable to have a negative coefficient, since the 
technology for enforcing tax collection is likely to be less efficient in poorer 
and less developed countries, leading to greater use of seigniorage revenues; 
o Openness to trade, Trade. We expect positive coefficients for this variable 
because countries with a larger foreign trade sector are more exposed to 
external shocks that may increase inflation levels and volatility;8 
• Variables accounting for economic performance and external shocks: 
o Growth of real GDP, GDP_gr. Fisher, Sahay and Végh (2002), and others, 
find that periods of high inflation are characterized by contractions in the 
                                                 
8 Edwards and Tabellini (1991) indicate that greater openness to trade may favor the adoption of trade-
related taxes in developing countries reducing the need of other distortionary forms of taxation such as 
the inflation tax. According to their view, greater openness to trade should be associated with lower 
inflation. Possibly, one could argue that the sign of the coefficient of trade openness is the net effect of 
two opposing channels affecting inflation namely, external exposure to shocks and tax substitutability.  
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levels of GDP. Thus, a negative coefficient is expected for this variable in the 
estimations for inflation levels. Given the consensus in the economic 
literature that inflation is bad for growth, this variable was treated as 
endogenous. Since inflation volatility may be better explained by the 
volatility of GDP growth, the standard deviation of the latter, SD(GDP_gr), 
was used in the estimations for Log[SD(Inf)]. Again, a negative coefficient is 
expected and the variable is treated as endogenous; 
o Real effective overvaluation of the national currency, Real_over. Negative 
signs are expected, as an overvalued currency leads to cheaper imports and 
brings inflation down. Since current inflation can affect the real exchange rate 
if nominal exchange rates to not float freely, this variable is treated as 
endogenous; 
o Logarithm of inflation levels, Log(Inf). This variable is included in the 
estimations for inflation volatility because, according to Fisher, Sahay and 
Végh (2002), the latter is positively related to inflation levels. Thus, a 
positive coefficient is expected in the models for Log[SD(Inf)]; 
o Percentage annual change in oil prices, Oil. Since higher oil prices lead to 
greater costs of production and prices, they are associated with higher and 
more volatile inflation (positive coefficients are expected). 
Although we consider that high inflation results in most cases from high budget 
deficits that are monetized, we decided not to include money growth and deficits in our 
baseline model because, as stated in the previous section, we are searching for the deep 
determinants of inflation. That is, we intent to find out the reasons why monetary and 
fiscal policies are not always consistent with low inflation. 
The empirical model for inflation levels can be summarized as follows: 
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 ititititiit InfInf ε+ν+++α= − 2',1' ,1, βWβX  iTtNi ,...,1,...,1 ==   (1) 
where Inf stands for the inflation level of country i at time t, α is a parameter to be 
estimated, β1 and β2 are vectors of parameters to be estimated, X is a vector of strictly 
exogenous covariates, W is a vector of endogenous covariates, ν are the fixed effects 
for each country, and, ε is the error term.  
 Substantial complications arise in the estimation of this model using OLS. In 
both the fixed and random effects settings, the difficulty is that the lagged dependent 
variable is correlated with the error term, even if we assume that the disturbances are 
not themselves autocorrelated. If the number of observations per country, Ti, is small, 
the fixed or random effects estimators will be inconsistent.9 Since in the estimations for 
annual inflation levels we have a maximum of 22 observations per country, T should be 
treated as small, implying that OLS estimations will not be efficient. 
 Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimator that solves the problems referred to above. First differencing (1) removes νi 
and produces an equation estimable by instrumental variables: 
 ittititiit DDDInfDInfD ε+++α= − ..... 2',1' ,1, βWβX     (2) 
where D is the first difference operator and the variables and parameters are defined as 
in (1). The Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimator uses the following instruments: 
levels of the dependent variable lagged two and more periods; levels of the endogenous 
variables lagged two and more periods; and, the first differences of the strictly 
exogenous covariates, which are used as their own instruments. 
The empirical model for inflation volatility can be summarized as follows: 
 ( ) itititiitInfSD ε+ν++= − 2' 1,1' , βWβX  iTtNi ,...,1,...,1 ==   (3) 
                                                 
9 See Greene (2000), chapter 14, and Arellano and Bond (1991). 
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where SD(Inf) stands for the standard deviation of inflation of country i for the 3-year 
period t, β1 and β2 are vectors of parameters to be estimated, X is a vector of strictly 
exogenous covariates, W is a vector of endogenous covariates (which are lagged one 
period), ν are the fixed effects for each country, and, ε is the error term.  
 The next section shows the results of Arellano-Bond linear dynamic panel-data 
estimations for annual inflation levels and Within Groups (fixed effects) estimations for 
3-year period standard deviations of inflation. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 The first empirical exercise consisted in finding the deep economic and political 
determinants of inflation levels across countries and time. After dealing with annual 
inflation, we searched for the main determinants of inflation volatility, using a panel of 
standard deviations of inflation for consecutive 3-year periods.  
 
a) Results for annual inflation 
The results of the Arellano-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimations for a 
dataset of annual data from 1975 to 1997 are shown in Table 1. As stated in the previous 
section, this methodology estimates the model in first differences. Thus, the dependent 
variable is the first difference (D1) of Log(inf) and the explanatory variables are in first 
differences as well.  
We started by estimating the model only with economic variables. Results are 
shown in column 1 of Table 1. The first lag of the dependent variable is statistically 
significant and the coefficient has a positive sign, confirming our expectation that there 
is substantial inflation persistence. Concerning structural variables, the value-added of 
the agricultural sector as a percentage of GDP (Agric_va) has the expected sign but is 
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weakly statistically significant only in the estimation of column 4, and foreign trade as a 
percentage of GDP (Trade) has a positive coefficient, indicating that greater openness to 
trade leads to higher inflation.10 With respect to economic performance, results are as 
expected: Real Gross Domestic Product growth, GDP_gr, and real effective exchange 
rate overvaluation, Real_over, have negative signs, confirming our intuition that 
inflation is associated with lower growth and undervalued currencies. Finally, the 
annual change in the price of oil (Oil_ch) has a positive sign, as expected, and is 
statistically significant. 
 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
 
Our next exercise was to add the political variables described in the last section, 
so that one could see whether they also contribute to the explanation of the great 
diversity of inflationary experiences over countries and time. Except for Cabchg in 
column 2 and AreaI and AreaII in column 3, the political variables are always 
statistically significant, which implies that they help explain inflation levels, even after 
controlling for a set of economic variables that affect inflation. The number of cabinet 
changes that occur within a year, Cabchg, has a positive sign, as expected, but is only 
statistically significant in the estimation of column 3. When the number of government 
crises, Govcrise, is included in the model instead of cabinet changes, the result is 
stronger - more government crises clearly lead to higher inflation (see column 4). Since 
these variables representing political instability are affected by inflation, they were 
treated as endogenous, which means that the Arellano-Bond estimator uses their levels 
lagged two or more periods as instruments. 
                                                 
10 GDP per capita, GDP_ppp, was never statistically significant when included in the estimations of Table 
1. These, and other results not shown, are available from the authors upon request. 
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 The index of economic freedom, Index, has a negative sign, as expected, 
indicating that greater economic freedom leads to lower inflation. When the index is 
decomposed in its five areas (see column 3), we get the results that the size of 
governments (AreaI) and the legal structure and the security of property rights (AreaII) 
do not affect inflation, while access to sound money (AreaIII), freedom to exchange 
with foreigners (AreaIV) and more flexible credit, labor and business regulations 
(AreaV) are associated with lower inflation. The positive coefficient associated with the 
polity scale, Polity2, may imply that autocracies are better at keeping inflation low than 
democracies, as Haggard and Kaufman (1992) and Paldam (1987) suggest. This result 
may also be influenced by the fact that most of the famous hyperinflation episodes took 
place in democratic regimes. 
 Column 1 of Table 2 shows the results of an estimation in which cabinet 
changes, Cabchg, are interacted with dummy variables accounting for inflation below 
and above 50 percent. Fisher, Sahay and Végh (2002) classify annual inflation as very 
high if it is equal to or greater than 100%, as high for the 50-100 percent range, 
moderate for the 25-50 percent range, and low if it is below 25%. In the estimations of 
Table 2, we use two dummy variables based on this classification: Inf≥50, that accounts 
for high and very high inflation, takes the value of one if inflation is greater than or 
equal to 50%, and zero otherwise; and, Inf<50, that accounts for moderate and low 
inflation, takes the value of one if inflation is lower than 50%, and zero otherwise.11 The 
interaction of cabinet changes, Cabchg, with inflation below 50 percent is not 
statistically significant, while the interaction of Cabchg with Inf≥50 is highly 
statistically significant and has a positive sign. Thus, the weak results concerning 
Cabchg shown in Table 1 may be due to the fact that cabinet changes are not associated 
                                                 
11 Dummies were also constructed for inflation below and above 100%. When these dummy variables are 
included in the model instead of Inf≥50 and Inf<50 results are virtually the same. 
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with higher inflation in low inflation countries. But, when we turn to episodes of high 
and very high inflation, there is a clear positive relationship between the number of 
cabinet changes that occur in a year (our proxy for political instability) and inflation.  
 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
 
In column 2, Govcrise, the number of government crises that occurred in a given 
year, was used instead of Cabchg. Now, there is weak evidence that political instability 
is positively associated with inflation also in low and moderate inflation episodes. 
Nevertheless, the statistical significance and size of the coefficient of Govcrise*(Inf≥50) 
are much greater than those for Govcrise*(Inf<50), indicating that the association 
between political instability and inflation is much stronger when the latter is high. In 
column 3, Govcrise was interacted with dummy variables for industrial (Ind_co) and 
developing countries (Dev_co). Results are in line with the ones described above. The 
interaction of government crises, Govcrise, with industrial countries is not statistically 
significant and the interaction of Govcrise with Dev_co is highly statistically significant 
and has a positive sign. Thus, the positive relation between government crises and 
inflation found in Table 1 is true essentially for developing countries (the ones that are 
responsible for the majority of the episodes of high and very high inflation).12 
 According to the models of Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) and 
Alesina and Drazen (1991), lower political cohesion (higher fragmentation) leads to 
greater political instability and delayed stabilizations, resulting in higher inflation. 
Column 4 shows the results obtained when we interact the index of political cohesion, 
                                                 
12 When Cabchg is interacted with Ind_co and Dev_co, the interaction variables are not statistically 
significant.  
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Ipcoh,13 with Inf≥50 and Inf<50. Results indicate that lower cohesion (or greater 
fragmentation) leads to higher inflation, as expected, but only in countries suffering 
from high or very high inflation. When the latter is low or moderate, the interaction 
variable is not statistically significant.14 15 
 
b) Results for inflation volatility 
 The second part of our empirical exercise consisted in investigating the main 
determinants of inflation volatility. For that purpose, we performed several Within 
Groups (fixed effects) estimations for a panel of the logarithm of standard deviations of 
inflation for 3-year periods.16 According to Fisher, Sahay and Végh (2002), inflation 
volatility is positively related to inflation levels. Thus, we expect that most of the 
variables that affect inflation levels are also determinants of inflation volatility. For that 
reason, most of the explanatory variables used in the models for inflation levels are also 
included in the models for inflation volatility (they are now expressed as 3-year 
averages). Furthermore, the level of inflation should also help explain its standard 
deviation. 
 As for inflation levels, we start with a model that includes only the economic 
variables referred to in section 3. The results of column 1 of Table 3 show that the 
                                                 
13 Ipcoh is based on the index of political cohesion created by Roubini and Sachs (1989). These authors 
showed that, for OECD countries, smaller cohesion would be associated with larger budget deficits. 
14 When Ipcoh is included in the model without any interactions, it is not statistically significant. The 
same happens with the interactions of Ipcoh with Ind_co and Dev_co Results are virtually equal when we 
use Frac, total fractionalization, instead of Ipcoh. 
15 A series of robustness tests not shown here were also performed. These consisted in adding more 
variables to the base model (column 2 of Table 1) or in replacing some variables for reasonable 
alternatives. We found that the following changes lead to higher inflation: greater executive constraints, 
Exconst (when this variable replaces Polity2); more leftist governments (higher Execrlc); smaller index of 
political rights, Pol_right; smaller index of civil liberties, Civil_lib; and, lower tax revenues as a 
percentage of GDP, Reven_GDP. 
16 The periods are: 1975-77, 1978-80, 1981-83, 1984-86, 1987-89, 1990-92, 1993-1995, and 1996-1997. 
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lagged dependent variable is not statistically significant,17 which means that inflation 
volatility is not persistent along 3-year periods. When this lagged dependent variable is 
excluded we get a static panel data model that can be estimated by the Within Groups 
(fixed effects) estimator without incurring in problems of inconsistency.18 The 
logarithm of inflation averages, Log(Inf), is highly statistically significant, indicating 
that inflation becomes more volatile at higher levels. But, since the correlation between 
the average and the standard deviation of inflation for 3-year periods is very high, it is 
more appropriate to exclude Lo(Inf) from the model.19 In fact, it should be noted that 
there are a some changes in results when Log[SD(Inf)](-1) and Log(Inf) are excluded: 
Trade and Oil_ch are no longer statistically significant, while Real_over becomes 
significant. 
 
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
 
 The remaining columns of Table 3 report a series of tests that consist in adding 
political and institutional variables to the model.20 Cabchg has the expected sign but is 
not statistically significant (column 3).21 But, an alternative indicator of political 
instability works better in these estimations for the standard deviation of inflation: 
Exetchg, the average number of times in a year that the effective control of the 
executive power changes hands, is statistically significant when we use it instead of 
Cabchg (column 4). Less economic freedom (smaller Index), greater ideological 
                                                 
17 The same result is obtained when we use the Arellano-Bond estimator instead of the Within Groups 
(fixed effects) estimator. 
18 Hausmann tests clearly indicate that the fixed effects specification is preferable to a random effects 
model and to a simple OLS. 
19 The correlation between Log(Inf) and Log[SD(Inf)] is equal to 77.45%. The correlation between Inf and 
SD(INf) is even higher (99.1%). 
20 The variables Trade, SD(GDP_gr)(-1) and Oil_ch were excluded from the model. They are never 
statistically significant when included in the models of columns 2 to 6. 
21 The p-value is .107, which means that Cabchg is almost weakly statistically significant. 
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polarization, (Polariz2), and lower Herfindhall index (greater fragmentation) of the 
parties’ shares in Parliament, Herftot, lead to higher inflation volatility. 
These results concerning political instability, polarization, and fragmentation are 
consistent with the models of Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Cukierman, Edwards and 
Tabellini (1992) and with the empirical results of Veiga (2000) that imply that greater 
polarization, fragmentation and political instability lead to the delay of inflation 
stabilization programs, resulting in higher inflation rates and, consequently, in higher 
inflation volatility.22 
 
5. Conclusions 
 The data show a strikingly high variability of inflation levels and volatilities 
around the world. Using the linear dynamic panel data GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and the Within Groups (fixed effects) estimator on a sample 
covering 154 countries analyzed in the period from 1975 to 1997, this paper finds that a 
higher degree of political instability, measured through several political and institutional 
variables, generates higher and more volatile inflation rates. Higher average numbers of 
cabinet changes, government crises or changes in the effective executive, measure not 
only political instability but also economic policy variability, since every new cabinet 
that takes over power might have a new set of preferences regarding inflation and 
unemployment levels. In addition, since every new government is inserted in a very 
unstable political and institutional environment, it is also very likely to be removed in a 
short period of time. These perverse mechanisms greatly affect the way governments 
conduct monetary and fiscal policies generating higher and more volatile inflation rates. 
                                                 
22 Robustness tests that consisted in adding variables to the model of column 4 of Table 3 revealed that 
the following are associated with higher inflation volatility: higher fractionalization of the Parliament, 
Frac; more leftist governments (higher Execrlc); lower civil liberties, Civil_lib; lower economic growth 
of trading partners, GDP_gr_tp; lower US Treasury Bill rates, TBill_rate; higher or more volatile external 
debt as a percentage of GDP, Ext_debt; and, more volatile government debt, Gov_debt. 
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We have also shown that the mechanisms indicated above are more pervasive and 
stronger in developing and, especially, in high inflation (above 50%) countries than in 
the developed and low inflation world. 
 The above-mentioned results are in line with those obtained by Paldam (1987), 
Edwards and Tabellini (1991) and Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) regarding 
the positive relationship between political instability and inflation in developing 
countries. Nonetheless, we further advance this literature by showing that inflation 
volatility is also affected in a similar way by the political environment. Given the costs 
in terms of economic growth and welfare generated by inflation volatility, we believe 
that this is an important contribution, not only for positive economics, but also in a 
normative way. Policy-makers in developing countries should be aware that it is 
essential to reform institutions and create viable mechanisms conducive to long-run 
price stability. Besides, inflation stabilization efforts may be only temporarily effective 
if they do not include serious fiscal and political reforms.23 
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Table 1: Results for yearly inflation 
Log(Inf) D1 1 2 3 4 
Log(Inf) LD1 .516 
(8.07)*** 
.470 
(7.91)*** 
.406 
(6.86)*** 
.463 
(7.71)*** 
Cabchg D1  .042 
(.93) 
.080 
(1.83)* 
 
Govcrise D1    .227 
(3.49)*** 
Index D1  -.399 
(-4.90)*** 
 -.394 
(-4.95)*** 
Area I D1   .074 
(1.34) 
 
Area II D1   .039 
(.99) 
 
Area III D1   -.095 
(-3.29)*** 
 
Area IV D1   -.191 
(-2.95)*** 
 
Area V D1   -.228 
(-1.75)* 
 
Polity2 D1  .025 
(2.71)*** 
.033 
(3.33)*** 
.024 
(2.83)*** 
Agric_va D1 .023 
(1.61) 
.026 
(1.43) 
.030 
(1.24) 
.028 
(1.67)* 
Trade D1 .012 
(3.48)*** 
.019 
(7.03)*** 
.021 
(7.24)*** 
.020 
(7.45)*** 
GDP_gr D1 -.046 
(-5.24)*** 
-.032 
(-4.68)*** 
-.029 
(-4.14)*** 
-.030 
(-4.61)*** 
Real_over D1 -.001 
(-.83) 
-.002 
(-2.40)** 
-.002 
(-1.80)* 
-.002 
(-2.28)** 
Oil_ch D1 .003 
(4.09)*** 
.003 
(4.69)*** 
.003 
(3.98)*** 
.003 
(4.44)*** 
# Observations 1607 1396 1209 1394 
# Countries 99 88 88 88 
Sargan test (Prob>Chi2) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sources: see Appendix 1. 
Notes: - Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation (using Stata 8); 
- Z-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10% 
- D1 stands for first difference and LD1 for one-time lagged first difference; 
- “Sargan test” is the test for over-identifying restrictions; 
- Second order autocorrelation of residuals is always rejected. 
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Table 2: Results using interaction variables 
Log(Inf) D1 1 2 3 4 
Log(Inf) LD1 .446 
(7.68)*** 
.454 
(7.76)*** 
.466 
(8.17)*** 
.453 
(8.03)*** 
Cabchg*(Inf<50) D1 -.023 
(-.60) 
   
Cabchg *(Inf≥50) D1 .497 
(5.41)*** 
   
Govcrise*(Inf<50) D1  .095 
(1.75)* 
  
Govcrise*(Inf≥50) D1  .676 
(4.47)*** 
  
Govcrise*Ind_co D1   .127 
(1.28) 
 
Govcrise*Dev_co D1   .241 
(3.18)*** 
 
Ipcoh*(Inf<50) D1    -.053 
(-1.40) 
Ipcoh*(Inf≥50) D1    .400 
(2.69)*** 
Index D1 -.363 
(-4.86)*** 
-.361 
(-4.78)*** 
-.390 
(-5.00)*** 
-.350 
(-4.45)*** 
Polity2 D1 .026 
(3.25)*** 
.024 
(3.25)*** 
.026 
(3.48)*** 
.026 
(2.84)*** 
Agric_va D1 .018 
(1.24) 
.022 
(1.56) 
.026 
(1.58) 
.016 
(1.24) 
Trade D1 .018 
(6.74)*** 
.019 
(7.60)*** 
.019 
(7.26)*** 
.019 
(6.24)*** 
GDP_gr D1 -.031 
(-4.94)*** 
-.027 
(-4.76)*** 
-.029 
(-4.70)*** 
-.034 
(-4.55)*** 
Real_over D1 -.002 
(-2.58)*** 
-.002 
(-2.23)** 
-.002 
(-2.31)*** 
-.002 
(-2.47)** 
Oil_ch D1 .003 
(5.09)*** 
.003 
(4.44)*** 
.003 
(4.54)*** 
.003 
(4.38)*** 
# Observations 1396 1394 1394 1395 
# Countries 88 88 88 87 
Sargan test (Prob>Chi2) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sources: see Appendix 1. 
Notes: - Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation (using Stata 8); 
- Z-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10% 
- D1 stands for first difference and LD1 for one-time lagged first difference; 
- “Sargan test” is the test for over-identifying restrictions; 
- Second order autocorrelation of residuals is always rejected. 
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Table 3: Inflation volatility for 3 year periods 
Log[SD(Inf)] 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Log[SD(Inf)] (-1) -.037 
(-.83) 
     
Log(Inf) .874 
(12.49)*** 
     
Cabchg (-1)   .210 
(1.61) 
   
Exetchg (-1)    .382 
(2.31)** 
.311 
(1.82)* 
.331 
(1.79)* 
Index   -.638 
(-3.99)*** 
-.621 
(-3.95)*** 
-.574 
(-3.70)*** 
-.678 
(-4.43)*** 
Agric_va .027 
(2.09)** 
.067 
(3.42)*** 
.046 
(2.25)** 
.047 
(2.24)** 
.051 
(2.34)** 
.027 
(1.20) 
GDP_ppp -.00004 
(-2.36)** 
-.0001 
(-8.03)*** 
-.0001 
(-3.11)*** 
-.0001 
(-3.17)*** 
-.0001 
(-3.61)*** 
-.0001 
(-3.24)*** 
Trade -.011 
(-2.59)*** 
.0006 
(.13) 
    
SD(GDP_gr) (-1) -.017 
(-1.51) 
.005 
(.32) 
    
Real_over (-1) .0004 
(.41) 
.002 
(2.21)** 
.002 
(1.58) 
.002 
(1.51) 
.002 
(1.57) 
-.001 
(-.32) 
Oil_ch -.004 
(-1.77)* 
-.004 
(-1.31) 
    
Polariz2     .308 
(2.53)** 
 
Herftot      -.761 
(-2.05)** 
42 42# Observations 569 593 563 563 549 515 
# Countries 97 97 90 90 90 89 
Adjusted R2 .69 .51 .55 .55 .58 .57 
Sources: see Appendix 1. 
Notes: - Within Groups (fixed effects) estimations (using TSP 4.5); 
- Models estimated with a constant; 
- T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10% 
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Appendix 1: Description of the variables used by source 
 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 
Execrlc Î Executive Party Orientation: 1=Right, 2=Centre, 3=Left, 0=Not 
applicable (for all those cases which do not fit into other mentioned 
category), Blank (for those cases where orientation is unknown) 
Frac Î Total Fractionalization (Chance that two random draws will produce 
legislators from different parties)  
Herftot Î Herfindahl Index Total The sum of the squared shares of all parties in 
parliament.  
Ipcoh Î Index of Political Cohesion: 
Presidential systems: 
= 0 when the same party controls the executive and legislature 
= 1 if different parties control the executive and legislature 
Parliamentary systems: 
= 0 for a one-party majority government 
= 1 for a coalition government with two parties 
= 2 for a coalition government with three or more parties 
= 3 for a minority government 
Polariz2 Î Ideological Polarization (Maximum difference of orientation among 
government parties (0-2))  
 
Cross National Times Series Data Archive (CNTS) 
Cabchg Î Number of Cabinet Changes (the number of times in a year that a new 
premier is named and/or 50% of the cabinet posts are occupied by 
new ministers) 
Exetchg Î Changes in Effective Executive (the number of times in a year that the 
effective control of the executive power changes hands) 
Govcrise  Î Number of Government Crises (rapidly developing situations that 
threaten to bring the downfall of the present regime - excluding 
situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow) 
 
Polity IV 
Exconst Î Executive Constraints (this variable refers to the extent of institutional 
constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive, 
whether an individual or a collective executive)  
Polity2 Î Polity (polity scale, ranging from 10 (strongly democratic) to 
 -10 (strongly autocratic)  
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Freedom House Rankings 
Pol_right Î Political Rights: is measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one 
representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest.  
Civil_lib Î Civil Liberties: is measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one 
representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest.  
 
Economic Freedom of the World (2002 Annual Report) 
Area I Î Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises 
Area II Î Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights 
Area III Î Access to Sound Money 
Area IV Î Freedom to Exchange with Foreigners 
Area V Î Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business 
Index Î Summary Index (of the 5 areas above) 
 
World Development Indicators (WDI) – World Bank 
Agric_va Î Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 
Ext_debt Î External debt (% of GDP) 
GDP_gr Î Real GDP growth (annual %) 
GDP_ppp Î GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) 
Gov_debt Î Central Government Debt %GDP 
Reven_gdp Î Tax revenue (% of GDP) 
Trade Î Trade (% of GDP) 
 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) - IMF 
TBill_rate Î Treasury Bill Rate – USA (code 60C ) 
Inf Î Changes in consumer prices, percent per annum (code 64 X) 
 
Other sources or combination of sources 
GDP_gr_tp Î Trading Partners' GDP Per Capita growth (%, weighted average 
by trade share): IMF Directions of Trade Statistics (for trade 
data); Global Development Finance & World Development 
Indicators (for GDP per capita growth). 
Oil Î Index for the price of oil: OECD Statistical Compendium. 
Real_over Î Real Overvaluation (using the real overvaluation index developed 
by Dollar (1992)): Global Development Finance & World 
Development Indicators. 
 
